Differences

This shows you the differences between two versions of the page.

--- topics:resilience [2026/03/21 00:04] – Status: in-review admin
+++ topics:resilience [2026/04/24 09:27] (current) – vso_vso
@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
-<WRAP catbadge>General topicsstatus: review
+<WRAP catbadge>General Topics</WRAP>
-status: in-review
-</WRAP>
 ====== Resilience ======
@@ Line 8: / Line 6: @@
 lead-authors: Vitaliy Soloviy
 contributors: Klaus Kubeczko
-reviewers: [Names]
+reviewers: Steven Wong
 version: 3.0
 updated: 16 March 2026
 sensitivity: medium
-ai-use: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (Anthropic) assisted with topic structuring, editorial revision, reference verification, and formatting; reviewed by Vitaliy Soloviy, 17.03.2026
+ai-use: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (Anthropic) was used for topic structuring, editorial revision, reference verification, and formatting; reviewed by Vitaliy Soloviy, 17 March 2026
+status: in-review
 </WRAP>
@@ Line 18: / Line 17: @@
 Resilience refers to the performance and evolution of energy systems under disruptions, from acute shocks like extreme weather and cyberattacks to chronic stresses like shifting demand patterns and climate change. Thinking about resilience goes beyond absorbing shocks to include how systems adapt to the changing nature of disruptions and how they transform to safeguard essential functions over the long term.
 </WRAP>
 ===== Why this matters =====
@@ Line 25: / Line 25: @@
 An acute example is the April 2025 Iberian blackout that collapsed the entire Spanish-Portuguese system within seconds. Technically mature renewable installations were operating without grid-forming inverter capabilities, and coordination protocols between TSOs had not been designed for a system where renewables supplied 78% of generation. Technical readiness in individual components did not translate into system-level resilience.((ENTSO-E Expert Panel. (2025). //Grid incident in Spain and Portugal on 28 April 2025: Factual report (Phase 1)//. ENTSO-E. https://www.entsoe.eu/publications/blackout/28-april-2025-iberian-blackout/))
-The number of actors involved in system operation is growing, and the coordination required to manage disruptions cuts across technical, regulatory, and governance domains.
+The number of actors involved in system operation is growing, and the coordination required to manage disruptions cuts across technical, regulatory, and governance domains. Smart grid transitions redistribute where resilience sits in the system. Distributed generation and storage shift some resilience functions from central infrastructure to the grid edge, where households, communities, and microgrid operators become participants rather than passive consumers. Meanwhile, digitalisation makes new forms of coordination possible but also introduces cyber vulnerabilities that did not exist in analogue systems. Whether these changes strengthen or weaken overall resilience depends on how well technical design, institutional rules, and the capacities of different actor groups are aligned.
-Smart grid transitions redistribute where resilience sits in the system. Distributed generation and storage shift some resilience functions from central infrastructure to the grid edge, where households, communities, and microgrid operators become participants rather than passive consumers. Meanwhile, digitalisation makes new forms of coordination possible but also introduces cyber vulnerabilities that did not exist in analogue systems. Whether these changes strengthen or weaken overall resilience depends on how well technical design, institutional rules, and the capacities of different actor groups are aligned with each other.
+<WRAP callout>
+Smart grid transitions redistribute resilience across the system — distributed resources can strengthen local resilience while digitalisation introduces new cyber vulnerabilities. The net effect depends on how well design, rules, and actor capacities are aligned.
+</WRAP>
-===== A shared definition =====
+===== Shared definitions =====
 Resilience in energy systems encompasses the capacity to anticipate, withstand, respond to, and recover from disruptions while developing and transforming over time to maintain core functions. Two dimensions structure the concept. The first concerns disruptions: the SINTEF/NTNU risk pyramid arranges these along a severity gradient from everyday operational events through serious incidents to catastrophic system failures, each requiring distinct governance and response types. The second concerns the capacities a system can draw on.
+<WRAP tablecap>
+**Table 1.** Four resilience capacities and their smart grid expressions.
+</WRAP>
 ^ Capacity ^ What it involves ^ Smart grid examples ^
-| Absorptive | Withstanding shocks without loss of core function through redundancy, robustness, and rapid response | Redundant communication paths, fault-tolerant grid design, ruggedised critical components |
+| **Absorptive** | Withstanding shocks without loss of core function through redundancy, robustness, and rapid response | Redundant communication paths, fault-tolerant grid design, ruggedised critical components |
-| Adaptive | Adjusting system configuration and operation in response to changing conditions, maintaining function through flexibility | Demand response programmes, flexible grid topologies, updated operating procedures, decentralised generation |
+| **Adaptive** | Adjusting system configuration and operation in response to changing conditions | Demand response programmes, flexible grid topologies, updated operating procedures, decentralised generation |
-| Transformative | Reconfiguring system architecture when existing arrangements cannot absorb or adapt to the scale of disturbance | Restructuring grid infrastructure and regulatory frameworks, transitioning from centralised to distributed architectures |
+| **Transformative** | Reconfiguring system architecture when existing arrangements cannot absorb or adapt | Restructuring grid infrastructure and regulatory frameworks, transitioning to distributed architectures |
-| Anticipatory | Identifying future risks and preparing responses before disruptions materialise | Climate impact modelling, scenario-based grid planning, horizon scanning, blackout preparedness exercises |
+| **Anticipatory** | Identifying future risks and preparing responses before disruptions materialise | Climate impact modelling, scenario-based grid planning, horizon scanning, blackout preparedness exercises |
 These capacities interact. Anticipation informs investment in absorption and adaptation, while timely adaptation may ease the deeper reconfigurations that transformation requires. A resilient system draws on all four, weighted according to the threats it faces and the time horizon it plans for.
+<WRAP tablecap>
+**Table 2.** Key operational and governance terms in resilience.
+</WRAP>
+^ Term ^ Definition ^
+| **Black start capability** | The ability of a power system or generation unit to restart without relying on external electricity supply, a key function following a complete system blackout.((Panteli, M., & Mancarella, P. (2015). The grid: Stronger, bigger, smarter? Presenting a conceptual framework of power system resilience. //IEEE Power and Energy Magazine//, 13(3), 58–66. https://doi.org/10.1109/MPE.2015.2397334)) |
+| **Grid-forming inverter** | An inverter that establishes its own voltage and frequency reference, enabling it to support grid stability independently rather than synchronising to an existing grid signal.((ENTSO-E Expert Panel. (2025). //Grid incident in Spain and Portugal on 28 April 2025: Factual report (Phase 1)//. ENTSO-E. https://www.entsoe.eu/publications/blackout/28-april-2025-iberian-blackout/)) |
+| **Islanding** | The ability of a portion of the distribution network or a microgrid to disconnect from the main grid and operate independently during a wider system disruption, maintaining local supply to critical loads.((Panteli, M., & Mancarella, P. (2015). //IEEE Power and Energy Magazine//, 13(3), 58–66. https://doi.org/10.1109/MPE.2015.2397334)) |
+| **Defence plan** | A coordinated set of automatic protection actions, including load shedding and controlled system separation, designed to arrest cascading failures and preserve as much of the system as possible during severe disturbances.((ENTSO-E Expert Panel. (2025). //Grid incident in Spain and Portugal on 28 April 2025: Factual report (Phase 1)//. ENTSO-E. https://www.entsoe.eu/publications/blackout/28-april-2025-iberian-blackout/)) |
+| **Preparedness** | The ability to anticipate risks, plan strategically, and coordinate effective responses across governance levels before disruptions occur; complementary to resilience, with emphasis on foresight and institutional coordination.((Zilli, R., et al. (2025). //Resilience and preparedness in Europe's energy transition: The role of low-carbon energy R&I// [Position paper]. European Energy Research Alliance. ISBN 9782931174111.)) |
 ===== Perspectives =====
-How resilience plays out in practice depends on who is responsible for it, what technical capabilities are in place, and which rules govern how actors respond. The three perspectives below examine resilience from each of these angles. Where they overlap, particularly around data infrastructure and coordination protocols, the interactions matter as much as the individual dimensions.
+How resilience plays out in practice depends on who is responsible for it, what technical capabilities are in place, and which rules govern how actors respond. Where the three perspectives overlap — particularly around data infrastructure and coordination protocols — the interactions matter as much as the individual dimensions.
 <WRAP perspectives>
 ==== Actors and stakeholders ====
-System operators carry primary responsibility for operational resilience, but as grids become more decentralised, the contributions of households with battery storage, energy communities, and microgrid operators gain significance. Different actors hold different views on resilience depending on how they use electricity, which constraints affect them most, and what timescales matter for their decisions. A transmission system operator planning infrastructure investments over decades faces different resilience questions than a community microgrid operator managing seasonal cyclone risk. Coordination among these groups, through knowledge exchange, resource sharing, and rapid response protocols, shapes whether resilience benefits are distributed equitably.
+System operators carry primary responsibility for operational resilience, but as grids become more decentralised, the contributions of households with battery storage, energy communities, and microgrid operators gain significance. Different actors hold different views on resilience depending on how they use electricity, which constraints affect them most, and what timescales matter for their decisions. A transmission system operator planning infrastructure investments over decades faces different resilience questions than a community microgrid operator managing seasonal cyclone risk. Coordination among these groups — through knowledge exchange, resource sharing, and rapid response protocols — shapes whether resilience benefits are distributed equitably.
 <WRAP case>
-**Japan — post-Fukushima resilience restructuring** \\
+**Japan -- post-Fukushima resilience restructuring** \\
 The systemic response to the 2011 disaster involved multiple actor groups: utilities restructured generation portfolios, regulators overhauled safety and market rules, municipalities developed local energy resilience plans, and households adjusted consumption patterns. The 7th Strategic Energy Plan, adopted in February 2025, continues to place energy security alongside decarbonisation as a core policy pillar.((Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan. (2025). //7th Strategic Energy Plan//. METI. https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/))
 </WRAP>
 <WRAP case>
-**Puerto Rico — post-hurricane grid reconstruction** \\
+**Puerto Rico -- post-hurricane grid reconstruction** \\
 Rebuilding the electricity system after Hurricanes Irma and Maria in 2017 involved federal agencies, the utility PREPA, municipal governments, and community organisations, exposing how fragmented institutional responsibilities can slow resilient recovery.((Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2018). //2017 hurricane season FEMA after-action report//. FEMA. https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/fema_hurricane-season-after-action-report_2017.pdf))
 </WRAP>
 <WRAP case>
-**Bangladesh — cyclone-resilient energy infrastructure** \\
+**Bangladesh -- cyclone-resilient energy infrastructure** \\
 Communities in coastal areas have worked with NGOs and government agencies to develop resilient off-grid solutions that withstand frequent cyclone exposure, demonstrating that resilience building in resource-constrained settings depends on local actor capacity as much as technology.((International Renewable Energy Agency. (2016). //Innovation outlook: Renewable mini-grids//. IRENA. https://www.irena.org/publications/2016/Sep/Innovation-Outlook-Renewable-Mini-Grids))
 </WRAP>
 ==== Technologies and infrastructure ====
-System architecture, how technical components are arranged and how they interact, is a major factor in a grid's resilience. Wide-area monitoring provides situational awareness during disturbances. Advanced distribution management systems enable rapid reconfiguration after faults. Microgrids with islanding capability allow critical facilities to maintain power during wider outages. Redundancy in communication networks ensures that monitoring and control functions survive localised failures. What distinguishes resilient architecture from robust architecture is the capacity not only to withstand shocks but to reconfigure in response to them.
+System architecture — how technical components are arranged and how they interact — is a major factor in a grid's resilience. Wide-area monitoring provides situational awareness during disturbances. Advanced distribution management systems enable rapid reconfiguration after faults. Microgrids with islanding capability allow critical facilities to maintain power during wider outages. Redundancy in communication networks ensures that monitoring and control functions survive localised failures. What distinguishes resilient architecture from robust architecture is the capacity not only to withstand shocks but to reconfigure in response to them.
 <WRAP case>
-**Australia — South Australia system resilience programme** \\
+**Australia -- South Australia system resilience programme** \\
 Following the September 2016 statewide blackout, the South Australian government and AEMO implemented a coordinated response including the Hornsdale Power Reserve, updated frequency control requirements, and revised grid connection standards for wind and solar that addressed the specific technical gaps the event had exposed.((Australian Energy Market Operator. (2017). //Black system South Australia 28 September 2016: Final report//. AEMO. https://www.aemo.com.au/-/media/files/electricity/nem/market_notices_and_events/power_system_incident_reports/2017/integrated-final-report-sa-black-system-28-september-2016.pdf))
 </WRAP>
 <WRAP case>
-**Spain and Portugal — April 2025 Iberian blackout** \\
+**Spain and Portugal -- April 2025 Iberian blackout** \\
 The loss of approximately 15 GW of generation within five seconds revealed how inverter-based renewable plants operating in fixed-power-factor mode contributed to cascading failure. The ENTSO-E factual report identified excessive voltage as the probable trigger, with plants disconnecting automatically to protect equipment rather than actively supporting the grid.((ENTSO-E Expert Panel. (2025). //Grid incident in Spain and Portugal on 28 April 2025: Factual report (Phase 1)//. ENTSO-E. https://www.entsoe.eu/publications/blackout/28-april-2025-iberian-blackout/))
 </WRAP>
 <WRAP case>
-**Denmark — Bornholm island microgrid demonstration** \\
+**Denmark -- Bornholm island microgrid demonstration** \\
 The EcoGrid EU project tested whether a distribution network with high wind penetration could operate in islanded mode, providing evidence on technical resilience capabilities for isolated systems dependent on variable generation.((EcoGrid EU. (2016). //EcoGrid EU: A prototype for European smart grids. Final report//. http://www.eu-ecogrid.net/))
 </WRAP>
 ==== Institutional structures ====
@@ Line 95: / Line 106: @@
 <WRAP case>
-**United Kingdom — Ofgem resilience obligations** \\
+**United Kingdom -- Ofgem resilience obligations** \\
 The RIIO-ED2 regulatory framework includes specific output targets for network resilience, including flood protection and overhead line undergrounding in high-risk areas, linking operator revenue directly to measurable resilience performance.((Ofgem. (2022). //RIIO-ED2 final determinations//. Office of Gas and Electricity Markets. https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications/riio-ed2-final-determinations))
 </WRAP>
 <WRAP case>
-**Nigeria — grid resilience governance** \\
+**Nigeria -- grid resilience governance** \\
 The institutional separation of generation, transmission, and distribution across different entities creates coordination challenges, particularly at the interface between the Transmission Company of Nigeria and regional distribution companies where operational responsibilities overlap.
 </WRAP>
 <WRAP case>
-**Chile — critical infrastructure protection framework** \\
+**Chile -- critical infrastructure protection framework** \\
-Institutional arrangements for protecting electricity infrastructure against seismic and climate-related hazards reflect the country's geophysical realities, illustrating how regulatory design can embed resilience requirements that are specific to local conditions rather than imported from generic templates.
+Institutional arrangements for protecting electricity infrastructure against seismic and climate-related hazards reflect the country's geophysical realities, illustrating how regulatory design can embed resilience requirements specific to local conditions rather than imported from generic templates.
 </WRAP>
 </WRAP>
-===== Key terms =====
-^ Term ^ Definition ^
-| **Black start capability** | The ability of a power system or generation unit to restart without relying on external electricity supply, a key operational function following a complete system blackout.((Panteli, M., & Mancarella, P. (2015). The grid: Stronger, bigger, smarter? Presenting a conceptual framework of power system resilience. //IEEE Power and Energy Magazine//, 13(3), 58–66. https://doi.org/10.1109/MPE.2015.2397334)) |
-| **Preparedness** | The ability to anticipate risks, plan strategically, and coordinate effective responses across governance levels before disruptions occur. Complementary to resilience, with emphasis on foresight and institutional coordination rather than system performance during and after an event.((Zilli, R., Angelova, E. H., Bindner, H. W., Breuhaus, P., Cabiati, M., Calis, G., Čaušević, S., El Gammal, A., Giovinazzi, S., Iannone, F., Jünger, J., Kiel, E. S., Kjølle, G., Koh, L., Lee, Y.-C., Linßen, J., Mäkinen, T., Manella, G., Martini, L., ... Watson, J. (2025). //Resilience and preparedness in Europe's energy transition: The role of low-carbon energy R&I// [Position paper]. European Energy Research Alliance. ISBN 9782931174111.)) |
-| **Grid-forming inverter** | An inverter that establishes its own voltage and frequency reference, enabling it to support grid stability independently rather than synchronising to an existing grid signal. Systems with high shares of inverter-based generation require grid-forming capability for voltage control and black start.((ENTSO-E Expert Panel. (2025). //Grid incident in Spain and Portugal on 28 April 2025: Factual report (Phase 1)//. ENTSO-E. https://www.entsoe.eu/publications/blackout/28-april-2025-iberian-blackout/)) |
-| **Islanding** | The ability of a portion of the distribution network or a microgrid to disconnect from the main grid and operate independently during a wider system disruption, maintaining local supply to critical loads.((Panteli, M., & Mancarella, P. (2015). The grid: Stronger, bigger, smarter? Presenting a conceptual framework of power system resilience. //IEEE Power and Energy Magazine//, 13(3), 58–66. https://doi.org/10.1109/MPE.2015.2397334)) |
-| **Defence plan** | A coordinated set of automatic protection actions, including load shedding and controlled system separation, designed to arrest cascading failures and preserve as much of the system as possible during severe disturbances.((ENTSO-E Expert Panel. (2025). //Grid incident in Spain and Portugal on 28 April 2025: Factual report (Phase 1)//. ENTSO-E. https://www.entsoe.eu/publications/blackout/28-april-2025-iberian-blackout/)) |
 ===== Distinctions and overlaps =====
 <WRAP distinction>
-**Resilience vs. reliability** \\
+**Resilience vs reliability**\\
 Reliability concerns continuous electricity supply under normal operating conditions and foreseeable contingencies. Resilience concerns the system's response to high-impact, low-probability events and chronic stresses that exceed normal planning assumptions. A reliable system may lack resilience if it cannot cope with conditions it was not designed for.
 </WRAP>
 <WRAP distinction>
-**Resilience vs. preparedness** \\
+**Resilience vs preparedness**\\
 Resilience describes the capacity to withstand, adapt to, and recover from disruptions. Preparedness describes the ability to anticipate risks and coordinate responses before disruptions materialise. A system can be resilient in its technical design while underprepared institutionally. The 2025 Iberian blackout illustrated this gap: renewable installations met technical performance standards individually, but the system lacked the grid-forming inverter deployment and cross-TSO coordination protocols that preparedness planning would have identified as necessary.
 </WRAP>
 ===== Related topics =====
-{{tag>Flexibility Institutions Transition Digitalisation}}
+[[topics:flexibility|Flexibility]] · [[topics:institutions|Institutions]] · [[topics:transitions|Transitions]] · [[topics:digitalisation|Digitalisation]] · [[topics:critical_infrastructure|Critical infrastructure]] · [[topics:operator|Operator]]
+===== Topic notes =====
-===== References =====
+Source flags: Nigeria case and Chile case both lack citations, need to add sources.
+~~DISCUSSION~~