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| topics:resilience [2026/03/17 10:17] – admin | topics:resilience [2026/03/20 00:02] (current) – Status updated to review admin | ||
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| - | <WRAP catbadge> | + | <WRAP catbadge> |
| + | status: review | ||
| + | </ | ||
| ====== Resilience ====== | ====== Resilience ====== | ||
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| updated: 16 March 2026 | updated: 16 March 2026 | ||
| sensitivity: | sensitivity: | ||
| - | ai-disclosure: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (Anthropic) assisted with topic structuring, | + | ai-use: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (Anthropic) assisted with topic structuring, |
| </ | </ | ||
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| ===== Key terms ===== | ===== Key terms ===== | ||
| - | <WRAP case> | + | ^ Term ^ Definition ^ |
| - | **Black start capability** | + | | **Black start capability** |
| - | the ability of a power system or generation unit to restart without relying on external electricity supply, a key operational function following a complete system blackout.((Panteli, | + | | **Preparedness** |
| - | </ | + | | **Grid-forming inverter** |
| - | + | | **Islanding** | |
| - | + | | **Defence plan** | |
| - | <WRAP case> | + | |
| - | **Preparedness** | + | |
| - | the ability to anticipate risks, plan strategically, | + | |
| - | </ | + | |
| - | + | ||
| - | + | ||
| - | <WRAP case> | + | |
| - | **Grid-forming inverter** | + | |
| - | an inverter that establishes its own voltage and frequency reference, enabling it to support grid stability independently rather than synchronising to an existing grid signal. Systems with high shares of inverter-based generation require grid-forming capability for voltage control and black start.((ENTSO-E Expert Panel. (2025). //Grid incident in Spain and Portugal on 28 April 2025: Factual report (Phase 1)//. ENTSO-E. https:// | + | |
| - | </ | + | |
| - | + | ||
| - | + | ||
| - | <WRAP case> | + | |
| - | **Islanding** | + | |
| - | the ability of a portion of the distribution network or a microgrid to disconnect from the main grid and operate independently during a wider system disruption, maintaining local supply to critical loads.((Panteli, | + | |
| - | </ | + | |
| - | + | ||
| - | + | ||
| - | <WRAP case> | + | |
| - | **Defence plan** | + | |
| - | a coordinated set of automatic protection actions, including load shedding and controlled system separation, designed to arrest cascading failures and preserve as much of the system as possible during severe disturbances.((ENTSO-E Expert Panel. (2025). //Grid incident in Spain and Portugal on 28 April 2025: Factual report (Phase 1)//. ENTSO-E. https:// | + | |
| - | </ | + | |
| ===== Distinctions and overlaps ===== | ===== Distinctions and overlaps ===== | ||
| - | < | + | < |
| **Resilience vs. reliability** \\ | **Resilience vs. reliability** \\ | ||
| Reliability concerns continuous electricity supply under normal operating conditions and foreseeable contingencies. Resilience concerns the system' | Reliability concerns continuous electricity supply under normal operating conditions and foreseeable contingencies. Resilience concerns the system' | ||
| </ | </ | ||
| - | + | < | |
| - | < | + | |
| **Resilience vs. preparedness** \\ | **Resilience vs. preparedness** \\ | ||
| Resilience describes the capacity to withstand, adapt to, and recover from disruptions. Preparedness describes the ability to anticipate risks and coordinate responses before disruptions materialise. A system can be resilient in its technical design while underprepared institutionally. The 2025 Iberian blackout illustrated this gap: renewable installations met technical performance standards individually, | Resilience describes the capacity to withstand, adapt to, and recover from disruptions. Preparedness describes the ability to anticipate risks and coordinate responses before disruptions materialise. A system can be resilient in its technical design while underprepared institutionally. The 2025 Iberian blackout illustrated this gap: renewable installations met technical performance standards individually, | ||
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| {{tag> | {{tag> | ||
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| ===== References ===== | ===== References ===== | ||
| - | ((Manca, A. R., Benczur, P., & Giovannini, E. (2017). //Building a scientific narrative towards a more resilient EU society. Part 1: A conceptual framework// (EUR 28548 EN). European Commission, Joint Research Centre. https:// | ||
| - | |||
| - | ((Zilli, R., Angelova, E. H., Bindner, H. W., Breuhaus, P., Cabiati, M., Calis, G., Čaušević, | ||
| - | |||
| - | ((ENTSO-E Expert Panel. (2025). //Grid incident in Spain and Portugal on 28 April 2025: Factual report (Phase 1)//. ENTSO-E. https:// | ||
| - | |||
| - | ((European Commission, DG Energy. (2022). // | ||
| - | |||
| - | ((Tomasgard, | ||
| - | |||
| - | ((Brown, M. A., Zhou, S., & Ahmadi, M. (2018). Smart grid governance: An international review of evolving policy issues and innovations. //Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy and Environment//, | ||
| - | |||
| - | ((Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan. (2025). //7th Strategic Energy Plan//. METI. https:// | ||
| - | |||
| - | ((Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2018). //2017 hurricane season FEMA after-action report//. FEMA. https:// | ||
| - | |||
| - | ((International Renewable Energy Agency. (2016). // | ||
| - | |||
| - | ((Panteli, M., & Mancarella, P. (2015). The grid: Stronger, bigger, smarter? Presenting a conceptual framework of power system resilience. //IEEE Power and Energy Magazine//, 13(3), 58–66. https:// | ||
| - | |||
| - | ((Australian Energy Market Operator. (2017). //Black system South Australia 28 September 2016: Final report//. AEMO. https:// | ||
| - | |||
| - | ((EcoGrid EU. (2016). //EcoGrid EU: A prototype for European smart grids. Final report//. http:// | ||
| - | |||
| - | ((Ofgem. (2022). //RIIO-ED2 final determinations// | ||