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| - | [[network_codes|]]; | + | <WRAP catbadge blue> |
| - | + | </ | |
| - | [[merge_into_other_topics: | + | |
| ====== Markets ====== | ====== Markets ====== | ||
| - | ===== Defining | + | <WRAP meta> |
| - | {{ :picture8.png? | + | lead-authors: |
| - | [Source: Cerqueira, Belhomme et al. 2016: A methodology for the analysis of market designs at the horizon 2030. CIGRE 2016] | + | contributors: |
| + | reviewers: [Names] | ||
| + | version: 0.4 | ||
| + | updated: 25 March 2026 | ||
| + | sensitivity: | ||
| + | status: draft | ||
| + | ai-use: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (Anthropic) was used for editorial revision, reference verification, | ||
| + | </ | ||
| + | |||
| + | <WRAP intro> | ||
| + | This topic is part of the ISGAN Wiki and is currently being developed. You can contribute directly by clicking the edit button, or use the [[about: | ||
| + | </ | ||
| + | |||
| + | <WRAP insight> | ||
| + | Electricity markets coordinate investment, dispatch, and system services across multiple timescales. Their design shapes which resources participate and who bears risk. | ||
| + | </ | ||
| + | |||
| + | ===== Why this matters ===== | ||
| + | |||
| + | <WRAP callout> | ||
| + | [To be drafted] | ||
| + | </ | ||
| + | |||
| + | ===== Shared definitions ===== | ||
| + | |||
| + | Electricity markets are institutional arrangements through which the production, delivery, and ancillary services of the electricity system are coordinated via price signals and contractual obligations. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Cerqueira, Belhomme et al. (2016) describe the market and service layers of the electricity system across four temporal horizons: long-term investment and capacity mechanisms; medium-term management of uncertainties and risks with existing assets; short-term generation-consumption balance; and post-delivery settlement.((Cerqueira, P., Belhomme, R., et al. (2016). A methodology for the analysis of market designs at the horizon 2030. //CIGRE 2016 Session//, Paris.)) | ||
| + | |||
| + | <WRAP figure> | ||
| + | {{picture8.png? | ||
| + | |||
| + | **Figure 1.** The market and service layers timeline.\\ | ||
| + | //Source: Cerqueira, Belhomme et al. (2016). Note: more recent versions of this framework may exist — see topic notes.((Cerqueira, | ||
| + | </ | ||
| + | |||
| + | The same authors identify the main issues under discussion in market design, spanning generation mix, networks, system security, resilience, demand, ICT, storage, multi-energy systems, and the strategies and policies coordinating them. | ||
| + | |||
| + | <WRAP figure> | ||
| + | {{picture9.png? | ||
| + | |||
| + | **Figure 2.** Examples of the main issues under discussion in electricity market design.\\ | ||
| + | //Source: Cerqueira, Belhomme et al. (2016).((Cerqueira, | ||
| + | </ | ||
| + | |||
| + | ===== Perspectives ===== | ||
| - | ===== Main Issues of Market Design [Cerqueira, Belhomme et al. 2016] ===== | + | <WRAP perspectives> |
| - | {{ : | + | ==== Actors and stakeholders |
| - | [Source: | + | |
| - | ===== Revision of the EU's internal electricity market design ===== | + | ==== Technologies and infrastructure |
| - | **What are the components and the objectives of the proposed revision?** | + | ==== Institutional structures ==== |
| - | "The proposal foresees significant revisions to several pieces of EU legislation, | + | The EU revised its internal electricity market design through a 2023 proposal amending |
| - | "The proposal further aims to **protect consumers from the price volatility of fossil fuels**, empower them with greater contract choice and more direct access to renewable energy. It also seeks to **incentivise investments in renewables** by facilitating access to longer-term contracts for developers (both State-supported Contracts for Difference, and private Power Purchase Agreements). This will be achieved by requiring Member States to ensure that instruments to reduce the financial risks associated to the buyer defaulting on its long-term payment obligations in the framework of PPAs are accessible to companies that face entry barriers to the PPA market and are not in financial difficulty. These can be guarantee schemes at market prices, as well as public support for non-fossil fuels PPAs." | + | </ |
| - | Source: Questions | + | ===== Distinctions |
| - | [[https:// | + | ===== Related topics ===== |
| + | [[topics: | ||
| + | ===== Topic notes ===== | ||
| + | **Content notes from source material:** | ||
| + | * The two CIGRE figures may have more recent versions — the original note in the source flags this. The CIGRE 2016 paper is conference proceedings without an open-access URL; cite bibliographically only until a stable URL is confirmed. | ||
| + | * Merge flag for role model: no current wiki page — likely belongs here or in [[topics: | ||
| + | * Network codes cross-reference flagged in source — handled via related topics. | ||
| + | * The EU market design section contains substantive institutional content that belongs in the institutional structures perspective rather than in shared definitions — moved there as a starting point for development. | ||
| + | * Page owner: Klaus Kubeczko. | ||
| - | ~~DISCUSSION|Discussion Section - PAGE OWNER: Klaus Kubeczko~~ | ||