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| topics:infrastructure [2026/03/27 08:15] – admin | topics:infrastructure [2026/04/20 13:09] (current) – vso_vso | ||
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| </ | </ | ||
| - | <WRAP insight> | ||
| - | Electricity grids are critical infrastructure that underpins most other systems; digitalisation expands their capabilities but also their attack surface, requiring integrated cyber-physical governance. | ||
| - | </ | ||
| ===== Why this matters ===== | ===== Why this matters ===== | ||
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| <WRAP callout> | <WRAP callout> | ||
| - | Digitalisation makes new forms of grid coordination possible | + | Digitalisation makes new forms of grid coordination possible |
| </ | </ | ||
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| Member states are required to identify critical entities, assess their risks, and ensure they have resilience plans in place. Implementation pace has varied considerably across the EU, with most member states missing the October 2024 transposition deadline.((European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities. //Official Journal of the European Union//, L 333, 164–198. https:// | Member states are required to identify critical entities, assess their risks, and ensure they have resilience plans in place. Implementation pace has varied considerably across the EU, with most member states missing the October 2024 transposition deadline.((European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities. //Official Journal of the European Union//, L 333, 164–198. https:// | ||
| </ | </ | ||
| - | |||
| - | @@GAP@@ Non-EU case needed: add a case showing how critical infrastructure governance is structured in a non-European context (e.g. US NERC CIP standards, or a national framework in Asia or Latin America). | ||
| ==== Technologies and infrastructure ==== | ==== Technologies and infrastructure ==== | ||
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| Under NIS2, electricity generators, transmission and distribution operators above defined size thresholds must implement risk management measures, report significant incidents within 24 to 72 hours, and demonstrate supply chain security.((European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union. //Official Journal of the European Union//, L 333, 80–152. https:// | Under NIS2, electricity generators, transmission and distribution operators above defined size thresholds must implement risk management measures, report significant incidents within 24 to 72 hours, and demonstrate supply chain security.((European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union. //Official Journal of the European Union//, L 333, 80–152. https:// | ||
| </ | </ | ||
| - | |||
| - | @@GAP@@ Technical case needed: add a case illustrating a specific cyber-physical vulnerability or resilience measure at the grid level, with technical specificity. | ||
| ==== Institutional structures ==== | ==== Institutional structures ==== | ||
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| NIS2 governs cybersecurity obligations while the CER Directive addresses physical resilience of critical entities. Together they form a dual-track framework, though coordination between the two remains a work in progress at both EU and national levels.((European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Directive (EU) 2022/2557. https:// | NIS2 governs cybersecurity obligations while the CER Directive addresses physical resilience of critical entities. Together they form a dual-track framework, though coordination between the two remains a work in progress at both EU and national levels.((European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Directive (EU) 2022/2557. https:// | ||
| </ | </ | ||
| - | |||
| - | @@GAP@@ Non-EU institutional case needed. | ||
| </ | </ | ||
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| Formatting pass 26 March 2026. Changes: catbadge corrected; duplicate status lines removed from catbadge; status field added to meta; AI statement moved from bottom of page to ai-use field in meta; superscript footnote references converted to inline DokuWiki footnotes; case examples wrapped in WRAP case blocks; insight block added (152 chars); section heading corrected to Shared definitions; | Formatting pass 26 March 2026. Changes: catbadge corrected; duplicate status lines removed from catbadge; status field added to meta; AI statement moved from bottom of page to ai-use field in meta; superscript footnote references converted to inline DokuWiki footnotes; case examples wrapped in WRAP case blocks; insight block added (152 chars); section heading corrected to Shared definitions; | ||
| - | Scope note: this topic does not appear in the current tracker | + | Should be integrated into broader infrastructure |
| + | @@GAP@@ Non-EU institutional case needed. | ||
| + | @@GAP@@ Technical case needed: add a case illustrating a specific cyber-physical vulnerability or resilience measure at the grid level, with technical specificity. | ||
| + | @@GAP@@ Non-EU case needed: add a case showing how critical infrastructure governance is structured in a non-European context | ||
| @@GAP@@ Both non-EU case gaps noted in Perspectives need filling before in-review status. | @@GAP@@ Both non-EU case gaps noted in Perspectives need filling before in-review status. | ||
| ~~DISCUSSION|Discussion — logged-in users only~~ | ~~DISCUSSION|Discussion — logged-in users only~~ | ||